

SECRET

25X1

STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE



VOL. 17 NO. 3

check
FALL 1973


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ARCHIVAL RECORD
PLEASE RETURN TO
AGENCY ARCHIVES, BLDG. ☐

SECRET

No 1507

25X1



25X1

SECURITY PRECAUTIONS

Materials in the *Studies* are in general to be reserved to US personnel holding appropriate clearances. The existence of this journal is to be treated as information privy to the US official community. All copies of each issue beginning Summer 1964 are numbered serially and subject to recall.



25X1

All opinions expressed in the *Studies* are those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the official views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other component of the intelligence community.


WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.



WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET



25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/12/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010004-7

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/12/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010004-7

*How to obtain North Vietnamese
soldiers for intelligence in Laos*

CASH ON DELIVERY

Robert A. Petchell

Through the early years of the fighting in Laos, technology was the primary source of intelligence about the enemy, and it left something to be desired. The jungle canopy frustrated photography, sensors which counted trucks or marching units could not determine what they were carrying, and the enemy order of battle derived from communications intelligence was less than complete.

Human sources were needed to fill the gaps. Friendly sources were available, and did yeoman service on such missions as road watch teams and reconnaissance. A more useful human source, however, would be the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) soldier. Pathet Lao sources were of minimal value—they had little access to NVA activities or plans, and were not sufficiently interested in NVA unit designations to provide adequate order of battle intelligence.

Five years into the war in Laos, NVA defectors or prisoners of war were few and far between.

What was needed was an aggressive program to provoke defection or to snatch NVA soldiers bodily from their environment. And for success in any snatch program, it would first be necessary to overcome the conviction of the average government soldier that all North Vietnamese were ogres 10 feet tall.

For assets, there were the Paramilitary Team Operations, a little-known companion program to the highly publicized Meo irregular battalions of General Vang Pao. The majority of these irregular guerrilla intelligence collection teams came from the area of Saravane Province and the Bolovens Plateau region, where NVA troops were more vulnerable than they were along the main routes of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. At a considerable distance from their supply bases, their hold on the territory not consolidated, they bivouacked their troops in or near villages, and they sought supplies from the villagers. NVA support and service soldiers began to move through the area in small groups or alone, as couriers or foragers, or on reconnaissance. Later on, during 1971 and 1972, deserters began leaving NVA units in combat, trying to make their way home to North Vietnam or find asylum in the villages.

These villages, however—in contrast to the Ho Chi Minh Trail area where most of the villagers had left—turned out to be the friendly “sea” in which the “fish” of the irregular guerrilla intelligence teams could swim.

Each of these teams normally had a team leader, a deputy, and a Morse operator, along with enough team members for an average total strength of eight men. At times, there were as many as twelve, or as few as two. Sometimes they wore uniform, sometimes native dress, and they carried a variety of weapons, from AK-47 or M-2 carbines to Colt .45s and hand grenades. They used VHF portable voice radios and Delco CW radios (PRC-64s).

The teams were encouraged to remain in the field for at least 30 days per mission, and often extended to 60 or 90 days with light resupply drops. Mem-

~~SECRET~~

Cash On Delivery

bers received a regular base salary—ranging in 1970 from \$16 a month for a team member to \$26 for a team leader—and additional mission pay of \$1 for each day spent on assignment in the field.

The real incentive under this system was the mission pay; salary could in effect be doubled simply by doing—or, unfortunately, by faking—a modicum of assigned work in the field. But where was there enough incentive to persuade the irregulars to lay one of those 10-foot NVA ogres by the heels?

The mission pay was intended to be payment for results, but it had the weakness, first, that it allowed for no differentiation to recognize either quality or quantity of results, and second, most of the missions were of such a nature that it was difficult for the headquarters to verify the results claimed.

The Bounty System

Out of these difficulties, the case officer handling Paramilitary Team Operations in Military Region IV of southern Laos came up in 1970 with a simple solution to bring rational cupidity to bear on primitive fear. He told selected guerrilla teams that they would receive *no* daily mission pay, but instead could share \$1,000 for each live NVA officer delivered to the base, \$400 for each NCO, and \$200 for each NVA private—Cash On Delivery.

It worked. The first reliable guerrilla teams who were offered this scheme declined, preferring to remain on regular assignment and daily mission pay, but pressure was maintained to cajole them into trying an abduction in return for the premium. The first successful effort, in fact, was by such a team on another mission which found the premium overpowering their fears when they spotted an opportunity to bring in an NVA sergeant. After several such successes by reliable teams, the case officer began calling in the more marginal teams and putting them on abduction missions without any option—and without mission pay. If they failed, they would be terminated; if they succeeded, they would earn the bounty and be allowed to return to regular missions at mission pay.

In November 1970, Lao guerrilla intelligence teams were able to induce the defection of a NVA sergeant, the first time in the Lao war that RLG soldiers were able to bring a NVA soldier under their control by means other than his voluntary walk into an RLG position or his capture in a dazed or wounded condition on the battlefield. It was the first successful aggressive operation specifically designed to pluck a NVA soldier out of the NVA environment. It began like this:

Team [] operated in an area five kilometers south of the southern provincial capital of Saravane during September and October of 1970. Their principal informant, [] had advised the team leader during their last meeting prior to the team's withdrawal that it was possible to capture a NVA officer. Team [] led by [] a reliable and authenticated team leader, was briefed and sent into the same area to collect intelligence and tried to work with [] on his capture plan. [] decided to brief every informant that Team [] was interested in capturing NVA soldiers. This simple step paid an immediate dividend.

A former RLG soldier, living about three kilometers south of Saravane and serving as an informant of Team [] knew of an NVA soldier who was living with a local Lao girl whose father was ethnic Vietnamese. The informant, [] went to see the father and enlisted his aid in convincing the NVA

soldier to defect to the RLG so he could marry his girlfriend and live in Laos. [] and the father successfully did just that, and [] was able to lead NVA Sergeant [] to the Team [] command post, whence he was taken by helicopter to the RLG military headquarters at Pakse. Unknown to [] was the fact that Sgt. [] was not only vulnerable in his relationship to the Lao girl, but had deserted his unit during a RLG Air Force bombing attack just a few days before [] proposed defection.

Team [] thus concluded the first successful operation, and was replaced by Team [] led by [] who decided to recontact [] and go after a NVA soldier. He was confident that if Team [] could do it, he could, too. It might be added that [] was impressed by the \$400 that Team [] received to divide among six men for 20 days' work. For team members, this was more than three times the dollar-a-day mission incentive pay.

The First Abduction

[] put their heads together and, after reviewing possible ambush sites, decided on a small trail [] knew was often used by NVA soldiers traveling alone. After three days of waiting in ambush alongside this trail Team [] got lucky on 2 January 1971. A single NVA soldier riding a bicycle approached the team which was hidden in high grass on each side of the trail. One team member and [] stationed in plain view, tried to hail the soldier. When it did not seem that he was going to stop, the team member charged the bicycle and bowled over the NVA soldier. He was immediately joined by the rest of the team, who hauled the struggling soldier into the grass, trussed him up, and while one team member removed the bicycle from the scene, moved off to the Team [] command post for successful delivery by helicopter. The captured soldier was Corporal []

As a result of the defection of Sgt. [] and the capture of Cpl. [] intelligence analysts in Laos received the first reliable human source order of battle information on the 968th NVA Group, a command unit for military operations in Southern Laos. In addition, Sgt. [] reported that a major effort would be made to capture all of the Bolovens Plateau including the key city of Paksong. The NVA did mount such an effort throughout 1971.

Meanwhile, Team [] decided to remain in the field and try again. They had successfully pulled the first abduction of a NVA soldier in enemy-held territory, and their case officer was anxious to keep them working. The team was expanded from the eight men who had snatched Cpl. [] to a 20-men team, divided into a five-man command post and three five-man snatch units. Each snatch unit was augmented by from three to five informants, who were to spot vulnerable NVA soldiers and then participate in the abduction. The snatch units fanned out in three directions and by 15 January 1971 had accomplished their second abduction.

Pfc. [] was assigned to work in a supply depot with 25 other NVA in Khanchom village, three kilometers northwest of Saravane. Two of Team [] informants lived in Khanthalat village, one kilometer south of Khanchom, and were acquainted with Pfc. [] Lao villagers were not allowed in Khanchom, but the informants knew that Pfc. [] often traveled

alone from Khanchom and always returned through Khanthalat where he stopped to visit his Lao friends. While six team members waited a few hundred meters away in the forest, the two informants went to await Pfc. [] along the trail from Khanthalat to Khanchom.

As Pfc. [] emerged from the village he spied the two and hailed them. They talked a bit and told [] they wanted to walk with him to Khanchom to ask for rice. Pfc. [] agreed and they all continued along the trail. Soon a third team member joined them and said he too was going to seek rice at Khanchom. At this [] became suspicious, since it was very unusual for any Lao villager to try to beg rice from a NVA depot, let alone three of them at one time. The third team member, spotting [] suspiciousness, gave the high sign in their tribal dialect, and all three pounced on him. Pfc. [] kicked and fought, biting one Lao on the thumb, but was subdued, tied by the wrists and elbows with parachute suspension line and taken to headquarters by helicopter, together with a triumphant Team [].

There was little of intelligence interest from [] interrogation, but his abduction was of great service operationally: it buttressed the argument that NVA soldiers were vulnerable to abduction or defection by a resourceful Laotian guerrilla team.

From Informant to Team Leader

Team [] departure left [] behind, hoping to continue sharing bounties with any team as willing to use his information as [] and [] had been. He was disappointed, however, because for the next three months the teams were unable to make contact with him. He then spent the ensuing three months on the run, seeking the safety of an RLG area. The North Vietnamese had learned of his informant role.

He finally reached Pakse, where he walked into Guerrilla Team Operations headquarters to volunteer as a team member. Recognizing his value in abduction operations, the case officer accepted [] as a team leader, and trained him and a radio operator in the *modus operandi* of the guerrilla teams. Then [] now operating as "Team []" went back into the field in August 1971, and by 18 September had succeeded in capturing Sgt. [] of the NVA 9th Regiment.

Sgt. [] had been in combat at Paksong against RLG forces when he decided to desert and return to North Vietnam. Heading north, he had covered almost 50 kilometers when he stopped to rest for the night in the village of Khiang Phoukhong. The village chief, a Team [] informant, made his way to the team hideout and told [] that an NVA soldier was going to spend the night at his house. [] and his radio operator returned to the village with the chief, bringing with them an ample supply of lao-lao, the local moonshine. They proceeded to get the tired and emotionally distraught NVA sergeant thoroughly drunk by the time their supply ran out, and invited him to another house to find more lao-lao.

As they left the chief's house, [] and his radio operator draped their arms around Sgt. [] shoulders as if to support the staggering sergeant, but halfway down the steps the friendly arms tightened into vise-like grips on his head and shoulders. They subdued him and delivered him to a helicopter landing zone. At headquarters, Sgt. [] provided important order of battle infor-

mation about the 9th Regiment, then the principal NVA unit in heavy contact with RLG forces near Paksong.

This was not the end of [] contributions. In January 1972 he successfully induced the defection of [] a mechanic-driver in a transportation pool of the 968th NVA Group. [] was an ethnic Vietnamese, but had been born in Vientiane and had talked to [] of owning his own taxi some day—a capitalistic pipe dream from the Hanoi viewpoint. [] urged him to defect with the argument that his birth in Laos would help him obtain Laotian acceptance, and that his dream was much more likely to come true in a free Laos than in a Communist North Vietnam. [] bought the pitch and defected.

The Capable Brigand

The most successful Lao guerrilla team leader ever to stalk the NVA on abduction missions was probably [] the leader of Team []. His past performance was inauspicious: returning overland in January 1971 from a roadwatch mission along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, he had refused to make the necessary signals for evacuation, and was taking a month to make his way back to base at an unproductive dollar-a-day per man. He was then advised by radio that the ruse would *not* earn any extra mission pay, and that he would probably be fired. [] "resigned" instead, returning to his home village after telling the team members to report him killed in action. He then sent his wife to claim an indemnity for survivors of team members killed in action.

The case officer flatly informed the wife that he did not believe [] had been killed, and that the indemnity would not be paid. While a glum [] was pondering his next move, he heard about the bounties offered for NVA soldiers, and the successes of Teams [] and []. He reasoned that if he could catch an NVA soldier, he could rehabilitate himself. With the aid of another former team member, he set out to redeem his job.

NVA 2nd Lt. [] of the F31 Reconnaissance Company and 1st Lt. [] of the 3rd Battalion, 968th Group returning from a reconnaissance, had stopped to make camp for the night near [] village. As [] and his assistant hid and watched, 1st Lt. [] began to bathe in a stream, while 2nd Lt. [] followed nature's call into the jungle. They followed 2nd Lt. [] and caught him literally with his pants down. Under the circumstances, it was relatively easy to subdue, gag, and hogtie him. They then turned their attention to 1st Lt. [] who was still bathing, and managed to subdue him. [] then secured the arms of both prisoners, but left their legs free for the 50-kilometer overland hike to guerrilla team headquarters.

On 28 April 1971, [] and his partner appeared at the base, leading the two bedraggled NVA officers by neck ropes. [] announced that he would deliver them only to the guerrilla team case officer.

[] was a very truculent prisoner and refused to talk, but the [] had no such scruples, and outlined the complete order of battle of the NVA military command for all of southern Laos. He also reported an NVA plan to conduct a major offensive in May, 1971, which took place and resulted in the loss of Paksong.

25X1 [] was an instant hero, albeit marked as a rogue and brigand
25X1 and a man who would have to be carefully handled. The case officer refused
to pay [] mission pay for his failed roadwatch mission, which
25X1 he had the nerve to ask for, but did agree to pay the monthly salary he had
missed from February to April 1971. He was told, however, that the only way
25X1 he could continue to work as a guerrilla team leader was capturing NVA soldiers
on a C.O.D. basis. [] pleaded and wheedled but could do no
better and accepted. It was on his second mission that he achieved one of the
more imaginative abductions.

25X1 Team [] was operating near a village about eight kilometers south
of Saravane, employing a net of informants who were seeking vulnerable NVA
soldiers. On 4 July 1971 an informant reported to [] that four
25X1 NVA soldiers had arrived in their village to buy buffaloes. Two soldiers had
gone out of the village on the buying mission, while two soldiers were staying
in the village chief's house. The informants reported that these two were lax
in their personal security and could be taken. The two NVA soldiers were Pfc.
25X1 [] of the Production and the Logistic
Companies of Binh Tram 38, a major logistical unit of the Ho Chi Minh Trail
complex.

A Bridal Party

25X1 [] with five team members, six informants, and []
the daughter of one of the informants, rounded up pigs, chickens, and lao-lao
and headed for the village to announce that [] and []
25X1 wanted to be married. It is a Lao custom that weddings be conducted at the
village chief's house and that there be a feast and drinking before and after
the wedding. [] plan was to pack the village chief's house
25X1 with his men and then jump the two NVA soldiers. The ruse worked. After
beginning the pre-wedding festivities, [] invited the two soldiers
to join the party.

25X1 One soldier, [] spoke Lao and was happy to join in, while Pfc.
25X1 [] who spoke no Lao sat warily by, AK-47 rifle across his lap, not partici-
pating. They had a pre-arranged signal that if [] poured whiskey
for the soldiers three times, the third pouring would be the signal to grab the
25X1 soldiers. As the team leader poured the third drink for Pfc. [] the deputy
team leader slammed Pfc. [] rifle to the ground and kicked it away while
25X1 [] seized Pfc. [] The team quickly tied up the two prisoners,
cautioned the bewildered village chief to maintain silence over what happened,
and left the hut, the bride, and the village.

25X1 Unfortunately for [] his propensity for thievery did him in.
He had kept for himself a large part of the \$2,400 he received for the four
prisoners, and paid his informants piddling amounts for their help. They were
so dissatisfied that when he appeared near their village for his third try, the
informants turned him in to the NVA authorities. He was last seen being led
eastward toward an NVA prison camp.

The Cash on Delivery program, from the first successful defection in November 1970 through January 1972, provided nine NVA prisoners or defectors. During this same 15-month period another case officer, encouraged by the successes, organized his own similar program and contributed six more prisoners. A successor case officer subsequently obtained eight more NVA soldiers through guerrilla intelligence teams.

Teams [] had indeed initiated a useful program for providing a continuing supply of NVA human intelligence resources.

25X1

*Ghostwriters in the
woodpile*

WHAT DID TRUMAN SAY ABOUT CIA?

Benjamin F. Onate

On 22 December 1963 the *Washington Post* and numerous other newspapers published an article syndicated by the North American Newspaper Alliance (NANA), and signed by the late former President Harry S Truman, which concluded with the following paragraphs:

For some time I have been disturbed by the way CIA has been diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational arm and at times a policy-making arm of the Government. This has led to trouble and may have compounded our difficulties in several explosive areas.

I never had any thought when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak and dagger operations. Some of the complications and embarrassments that I think we have experienced are in part attributable to the fact that this quiet intelligence arm of the President has been so removed from its intended role that it is being interpreted as a symbol of sinister and mysterious foreign intrigue—and a subject for Cold War enemy propaganda.

With all the nonsense put out by Communist propaganda about "Yankee imperialism," "exploitive capitalism," "war-mongering," "monopolists" in their name-calling assault on the West, the last thing we needed was for the CIA to be seized upon as something akin to a subverting influence in the affairs of other people. . . .

But there are now some searching questions that need to be answered. I, therefore, would like to see the CIA be restored to its original assignment as the intelligence arm of the President, and whatever else it can properly perform in that special field—and that its operational duties be terminated or properly used elsewhere.

We have grown up as a nation, respected for our free institutions and for our ability to maintain a free and open society. There is something about the way the CIA has been functioning that is casting a shadow over our historical position, and I feel that we need to correct it.

The starter's flag had been dropped, and the contestants raced into the field. Senator Eugene McCarthy (D., Minn.), appeared in the *Saturday Evening Post* with an article entitled: "The CIA is Getting Out of Hand." Richard Starnes used the alleged Truman article as the peg for a column in the *Washington Star* headlined "HARRY S FIRES TELLING BROADSIDE AT CIA." Dozens of editorials along the same line sprouted in such papers as the *New York Post*, the *Tarrytown, N.Y., News*, the *Berkshire Eagle* of Pittsfield, Mass., *The Charlotte News* in North Carolina, the *Pittsburgh Press*, the *Cleveland Press and News* and the *Columbus Citizen-Journal* in Ohio, the *Milwaukee Journal*, the *Kansas City Times*, and the *Sacramento Bee* and *Santa Monica Evening Outlook* in California. It was open season on CIA over the 1963 year-end holidays, and for more than nine years since then the article in question has been stock-in-trade for writers of books and articles attacking CIA, most recently L. Fletcher Prouty in his *The Secret Team: The CIA and its Allies in Control of the United States and the World*.

The CIA rocked back on its heels for a while, stunned that the source for these attacks should be President Truman, the Enacting Father of the Agency, and the man who had put CIA into the field of "such other functions and duties"

by covert action assignments in Italy, Greece, and Turkey. In June of 1948, in fact, Truman himself had led the National Security Council to authorize the creation of a new office within CIA to carry out cover operations directed against secret Communist subversion (the Office of Policy Coordination).

Had Truman written the statement? It developed that he had *not*, but as the Germans say, "Lies have long legs," and by the time a denial could have been obtained, the impact of the original statement was so widespread that a denial never would have caught up with it.

Nevertheless, as long as the statement continues to pop up in fantasies like Prouty's, it appears to serve some purpose to get the facts into the record.

Allen Dulles, by this time in retirement, drafted a three-page letter to the former President at Independence, Mo., noting more in sorrow than in anger the views recited in the NANA article, and reminding him that while Truman had indeed stressed the role of CIA as the President's intelligence arm, he had also by his own action first put CIA into the covert operations field.

The draft, found in Dulles' papers, does not show whether or not it was sent. On 17 April 1964, however, Dulles was in Kansas City for a speaking engagement, and made an appointment to see Truman that afternoon.

In a memorandum of 21 April 1964 for the General Counsel of CIA, Dulles subsequently reported:

I then reviewed with Mr. Truman the part he had had in supplementing the overt Truman Doctrine affecting Greece and Turkey with the procedures largely implemented by CIA to meet the creeping subversion of Communism, which could not be met by open intervention, military aid, under the Truman plan. I reviewed the various covert steps which had been taken under his authority in suppressing the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, of the problems we had faced during the Italian elections in 1948, and outlined in some detail . . . the organization of the Free Europe Committee and Radio Free Europe, keeping hope alive in the Satellite countries, etc.

Mr. Truman followed all this with keen interest, interjected reminiscences of his own, recalled vividly the whole Italian election problem, as well as the Huk situation. I then showed him the article in the *Washington Post* of December 22, 1963, which I suggested seemed to me to be a misrepresentation of his position. I pointed out the number of National Security Actions (Action #4 and Action 10-2) which he had taken which dealt with covert operations by the CIA. He studied attentively the *Post* story and *seemed quite astounded at it. In fact, he said that this was all wrong. He then said that he felt it had made a very unfortunate impression.* [Emphasis added]. . . .

At no time did Mr. Truman express other than complete agreement with the viewpoint I expressed, and several times he said he would see what he could do about it, to leave it in his hands. He obviously was highly disturbed at the *Washington Post* article. . . .

I cannot predict what will come of all this. It is even possible, maybe probable, that he will do nothing when he thinks it over. He may, of course, consult with those, whoever they are, who induced him to make the original statement.

Even in retirement, Dulles was still proving himself a prescient estimator. There is no record that Truman took any further action on the matter. But the final piece in the puzzle fell into place six weeks later when Lt. Gen. Marshall S. (Pat) Carter, then the DDCI, was at the Truman Library in Independence for one of the regular briefings arranged for the former President by President Johnson.

Prior to their meeting with Truman, General Carter and his Executive Assistant, Enno H. Knoche (now head of FBIS), were chatting briefly with David Noyes. Noyes had been a White House assistant while Truman was President, and continued to serve him in various capacities in retirement. According to a memorandum based on Knoche's notes on the meetings, "Noyes evidently drafts Mr. Truman's statements and articles, and admitted quite freely the authorship of the Truman article on CIA which was published on 22 December 1963. . . . It is highly doubtful whether President Truman ever saw the article prior to its publication, as he was already beginning to age considerably at that time."

During the actual briefing of Truman, Knoche recalls, "Carter did get into this subject, at least slightly. He referred in general to recent criticism of the Agency and its operations, and reminded Truman that it was he himself who had authorized most of the early clandestine operations in response to such challenges as Italy and Greece. Truman broke in on the General's statement to say yes, he knew all that, it was important work, and he would order it to be done again under the same circumstances. He went on to add, however, that he had set up the CIA to pull together basic information required by the presidency, but which had been denied to him by State and Pentagon handling procedures. He said this was the main purpose." General Carter dropped the subject at that point, and went on with the briefing.

UNCLASSIFIED

... 'but one life to lose,'
yet hanged three times

THE STATUE OF NATHAN HALE

The original of the Nathan Hale statue entering on duty at CIA in September has had a lively career, according to a brief photo-essay in the August *American Heritage*.

Since 1914, according to the article by George D. Vaill, assistant secretary of Yale University, Hale stood guard over the New Haven campus in relative serenity, until he suddenly disappeared from his pedestal in June 1969.

Irate letters poured in from alumni and townspeople who had leaped to the conclusion that the statue had been buried to avoid provocation of activist Yalies who might regard it as a symbol of militarism. The facts were that the statue had been removed for a long-overdue cleaning, and to enable a cast to be made for the production of replicas—including the one for CIA.


The original statue, slightly larger than life size, was created by American sculptor Bela Lyon Pratt on the basis of contemporary descriptions of Hale. There are no known contemporary portraits of him. It stands in front of Hale's dormitory, Connecticut Hall, on the Old Campus at Yale, where Hale received his B.A. in 1773. Caught behind British lines in New York three years later on a mission for General Washington, he was hanged after his final statement, quoted on the bronze base of the statue: "I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country." It has been claimed that he was betrayed by his Tory first cousin, a Harvard graduate.

When Phillips Academy at Andover, Mass., wanted a copy of the statue for a new dormitory to be called Nathan Hale House, the Renaissance Art Foundry of South Norwalk, Conn., borrowed Pratt's original plaster model from the Lyman Allyn Museum in New London, Conn. After the new statue was made and sent to Andover, the plaster model was destroyed by a fire at the foundry.

Meanwhile, the statue at Yale had been shabbily treated by the weather, the birds, and a tinsmith working on the eaves above who had spilled a can of muriatic acid. Some of it scored a direct hit on Hale's head and, according to Vaill, "gave him the appearance of having had milk poured over him." The years passed, and somehow there was never enough money in the budget to refurbish Nathan properly.

Renaissance, however, wanted to borrow the statue in order to make a new plaster model for the museum, and offered in exchange to clean and refinish the bronze. When the workmen came for the statue in June 1969, they decided the most practical and safest method would be to sling a noose around the neck and hoist it up with a power winch.

This second hanging disclosed a vertical hole in the center of the pedestal accommodating a bronze canister. The canister in turn contained the soggy remains of papers placed there in 1914—illegible because seepage and freezing had burst the canister. The contents could be identified only by a list found in the Yale Library archives.



THE HALE STATUE IN NEW HAVEN

A new capsule was prepared, with a list of the 1914 contents and some more contemporary documents and photographs, including one of Yale geologists examining Apollo 11 moon rocks. Another depicted Miss Amy Solomon registering as the University's first female undergraduate student.

By September, Nathan Hale was back at Yale for the fall semester. On 30 September—the 55th anniversary of the original dedication—Yale President Kingman Brewster, Jr., deposited the new canister, and a bright and shining Nathan Hale, the rope tight around his neck for the third time, was lowered gently back into place.

In addition to the CIA copy of this statue and that at Andover, there are copies outside FBI Headquarters on Constitution Avenue, at New London, and at Bristol, Conn.

The Editor

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

CODEWORD BARBAROSSA, by Dr. Barton Whaley, the MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, England, 1973.

This book has merit. Barton Whaley is a most industrious researcher. If he marshals his facts too autocratically, his book is nevertheless clean of structure and easy to read. It is also sprightly, if a bit self-consciously so. And it is full of facts; no other book on the subject comes near it in terms of density of data.

Whaley's thesis is that Hitler fooled Stalin and that the Germans caught the Russians off guard when they invaded the USSR on 22 June 1941, because Hitler tricked Stalin into thinking that any German attack would be preceded by an ultimatum. As Harrison E. Salisbury observed in a New York Times book review of 6 May 1973, "Whaley offers no evidence that the ultimatum rumor originated with the Germans." *Code Barbarossa* includes an Appendix A that lists 67 German documents dealing with deception planning for Barbarossa. None of these, however, discusses an ultimatum. Most of them deal with planting two other false ideas: that the Germans would not attack except preemptively, and the German build-up was aimed at England (Sea Lion). This failure to prove its central thesis is the book's most evident weakness. As Salisbury noted, Whaley did not ask the right question. He is so intent upon explaining how Hitler tricked Stalin that he has failed to note that Stalin deceived himself, and that his dictatorial political system, devoid of checks and balances, was most vulnerable to such self-deception.

Codeword Barbarossa has other flaws that may be grouped under four headings: occasional stylistic awkwardness, conceptual oversimplification, inadequate knowledge of intelligence services and their work, and a lack of humility which cannot fairly be termed arrogance but which stops not far short.

Whaley writes clearly and rather well but without a feel for good prose. Sometimes he comes out with phrases like these:

"... the seemingly disinterested Soviet ambassador." (p. 116.) The context makes it plain that the author meant uninterested, not impartial.

"... his remarkable series of scoops . . . were overlooked. . . ." (p. 121.)

"Reasons of state continue to suppress this controversial truth." (p. 142.) Whaley seems to be talking about a truth that would arouse controversy if expressed.

"Typical of this type was the intelligence clearinghouse in Stockholm operated by Japanese Military Attaché Onodera and to which Soviet intelligence was linked." (p. 167.)

"One clear proof of surprise of timing is if crisis catches the key officials pursuing . . . routines."

Whaley's tendency toward simplistic concepts is illustrated in his discussion (pp. 147-150) of whether German anti-Nazis who spied for Nazi Germany's enemies were traitors or not. Speaking of the 20th of July group, he says, "Because no money changed hands, their motives were clearly those of patriotic treason." The subject is complex—as complex as the characters of such men of July 20th as Hans Oster, Otto John, and Adam von Trott zu Solz. An adequate discussion cannot be crammed into four pages. Moreover, the subject is not germane to the book.

Perhaps three of Whaley's generalizations will serve adequately as illustrations of a lack of scholarly humility. He says that Rudolf Roessler "had access to superb intelligence on the operational plans and order of battle of the Wehrmacht, although the exact nature of his sources has never been disclosed, least of all to the Russians." (p. 100.) How does Dr. Whaley know what the Russians do and do not know? Or for another Olympian pronouncement: "Furthermore, . . . their [the Japanese] intelligence services were generally overrated. . . ." (p. 111. No citation of source.) The third example on p. 191, is the worst of the lot: "In general, the Soviet intelligence system has proven both inefficient and highly fragmented." (Source cited—another book by Whaley.)

The fourth weakness appears frequently throughout this book. Whaley is not an expert on intelligence services, although *Codeword Barbarossa* more than suggests that he thinks he is. Again, a few illustrations will have to suffice:

The author says that on the first day of their invasion of the USSR the Germans recovered a complete and current copy

. . . of their own entire order of battle . . . from the abandoned safe of the commander in chief of the First Cossack Army at Lomza. It is quite possible this last material was one of the fruits of Rudolf Roessler's magnificent GRU Intelligence line from Berlin to London [?] to Switzerland to Moscow." (p. 28.) Or again, on p. 100: "As intelligence began to accumulate that indicated an impending German attack on Russia, the Swiss intelligence decided . . . to let Roessler act as a conduit of such warnings to the Russians.

The first of the Rote Drei reports for which Rudolf Roessler was the source was sent to Moscow more than a year *after* the German invasion of the Soviet Union. (See *Studies in Intelligence*, XIII/3, p. 62.)

Whaley says of the Schulze-Boysen and Harnack ring in Germany, "This particular group of patriotic leftist and Communist conspirators had received their espionage assignment . . . only a month or so before [early June 1941] and were still fumbling their way . . . toward the professionalism that they would achieve by the time of their arrest in August-September 1942." (p. 98.) In fact, this group consisted of amateur spies who never achieved professionalism. Members and leaders of the group were never given any training in the USSR or any effective training anywhere. They were the weakest of the Rote Kapelle teams. Their operational life was about one year.

A third example appears on p. 103. Whaley says that there is much to commend Malcolm Muggeridge's hypothesis that British intelligence, not sources in Germany, was the true source of the Lucy messages to Moscow. There is practically nothing to commend this hypothesis. Muggeridge bases this fanciful notion on the fact that during World War II the British read German military radio traffic. But the Germans read a good deal of the radio traffic from the Soviet sources in Switzerland including Lucy. The Germans could hardly have remained unaware that they were decoding their own military messages.

It would be easy to pile up further proofs of this author's lack of expertise in this area. This reviewer noted fifteen serious errors of fact. But space precludes.

A final word. A reader of *Codeword Barbarossa* is likely to become aware that as he sees history here unfolding, he is looking very much through British and American eyes. Of the 362 books and articles in the bibliography, 306 are in English. The 56 remaining works are in German, Russian, French, Italian,

Swedish, and Finnish. The bibliography sometimes indicates whether translations exist and sometimes does not. Because the bibliography yielded no clue about whether Dr. Whaley had read the originals of the six works chosen arbitrarily for testing (one for each language) or had read a full translation, a translation of a few pages, a summary in English, or some other variant, each of the six works was checked through the 38 pages of footnotes in order to determine whether footnote references would answer the question. Although the author footnotes many of his bibliographic items frequently—for example, he footnotes himself 18 times—four of the six foreign language works are not footnoted at all. The book in Russian is footnoted three times, but all three references are to excerpts translated into English. Only the book in Swedish is cited by footnotes that do not refer to a translation. Even so, the footnotes offer no clue as to whether Dr. Whaley has read this book in Swedish. A scholar's ability to handle a complicated international subject like *Barbarossa* is determined to some degree by his ability to consult sources first-hand, without being completely at the mercy of those whims of fate that determine whether something will be translated or not.

Codeword Barbarossa is the product of intelligence, impressive industriousness, a real knack for organizing facts and discerning their interrelationships, a respect for chronology, lucidity, and other virtues. If Dr. Whaley had recognized the book's limitations at the outset, had stipulated them candidly, and had neither made nor implied claims to having become a major authority on deception, his book would deserve high marks. Judged against the higher standards that he himself has set, *Codeword Barbarossa* is unsatisfying.

Mark A. Tittenhofer

CODE NUMBER 72/BEN FRANKLIN: PATRIOT OR SPY? By Cecil B. Currey.
(Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1972. 331 pp.)

"Impartiality," said the late Professor Gaetano Salvemini, "is a dream. Honesty is a duty." This ought, as a matter of course, to be every historian's motto. It's also something every serious reader of history should keep in mind. It's so deeply in the nature of man to take sides that partiality becomes the life blood of historical writing while complete impartiality, if achievable at all, would probably result only in boredom. By the same token, however, the honesty becomes increasingly important as the intensity of the partiality rises.

Cecil B. Currey, Professor of Early American History and Culture at the University of South Florida, has written a book which illustrates half of Professor Salvemini's dictum. Currey's partiality is beyond question but his honesty is below par. True enough, he does point out in his introduction that his book isn't intended to be a complete portrait of Franklin. No attempt is made, he says, to assess the Doctor's undoubted scientific, philosophical, and literary achievements. But, quoting Sam Adams to the same effect, Currey points out that scientific genius doth not necessarily a diplomat make, and it is Franklin's alleged inadequacies—or worse—in the Paris mission that Currey undertakes to demonstrate. We are given, therefore, not exactly a portrait à la Cromwell, "warts and all," but just the warts by themselves.

Actually, when you come right down to it, Professor Currey's book isn't so much a Franklin study *per se* as another broadside in the apparently interminable "Lee-Franklin" (or perhaps better: the "Lee/Adams/Izard, etc.—Jay/Franklin/Morris, etc.") imbroglio. This bitter controversy, born largely (as Currey quite rightly observes) out of conflict over the development of trans-Appalachian land, has raged with scarcely diminished intensity since the French and Indian War, and the end seems nowhere in sight. A consummation devoutly to be wished of America's first 200 years would be a final, objective, definitive, and honest (if not impartial) work which would lay this quarrel to rest for good and all. Human emotions being what they are, however, the prospect of such a bi-centennial birthday present is dim.

The deflation of the Parson Weems approach to American history has been a popular pastime for quite a while now. A somewhat newer, but no less popular game is the *ex post facto* psychoanalysis of prominent historical figures. Mounting both these horses at the same time, Professor Currey gallops off on a wild ride to rescue the Lees and head off the Franklins and Deanes at the pass. Briefly his thesis is this:

Franklin was obsessed by a desire to overcome the degradation of his poverty-ridden childhood. This led, in turn, to an overdriven striving for success. This striving plus a brilliant mind enabled him to make it in the business world while still in his forties. But it also caused him to be unsatisfied with this achievement and to yearn for the social prestige deriving from vast land-holdings. The *real* aristocracy in the British Empire was the landed gentry. This accounts for his obsession with the multi-million-acre Ohio Valley land development scheme, known as the Vandalia Project—an obsession which persisted to his dying day. It motivated everything he did. It led him to "flee America for France" lest he be caught in a collapsing rebellion. It led him to

deal with the enemy in the hope of securing himself and his land development no matter which side won. And, finally—the major theme of the book—it led him to cooperate actively with known agents of the BIS, to supply the British Government with information on his doings in Paris and to try to sell out the cause of independence.

Well.—Quite an indictment.

But there were heroes in those dark days. In this nefarious behavior, "Ben" (Currey always calls him "Ben") was fought every inch of the way by Arthur Lee, assisted by William Lee, his brother, and by Ralph Izard, all of whom suffered intensely under the malevolent and vicious slandering of the old Doctor and were the only ones who saw through his evil machinations.

To a point this is fairly convincing. It is true that Franklin's origins were at the poverty level, that he made a fortune before he was 50, that he persisted in pursuing the Vandalia project to the end of his life, that he remained in touch with Thomas Walpole, the Wharton brothers, and the other British Vandalia speculators throughout the war, and that he harbored and defended Dr. Edward Bancroft. Professor Currey's problem comes when he tries to fit these facts to his apparently pre-conceived notion of Franklin as a British agent.

Several things are lacking; evidence, for one. What happens is that Currey, confused by the fact that the American mission in Paris was thoroughly penetrated by British agents, persuades himself that, since Franklin was a smart man, he must have known of these penetrations, and if he knew it and allowed it to go, he must have been in on it. When Currey then adds in the fact that the British service used a pseudonym, "Moses," for Franklin, and that he was given the code number "72" in one of their cyphers, it becomes "obvious" to Professor Currey that Ben was a spy. (The fact that the same cypher had a number for George Washington—206—is somehow overlooked.)

For Currey, the central villain in all this is Dr. Edward Bancroft, native of Westfield, Mass., resident of London since about 1765, friend of Franklin and fellow Vandalia investor, and well known (since 1889 anyway) as a double agent. When the Committee of Secret Correspondence decided, in the spring of 1776, to send Silas Deane to Paris to see what he could drum up in the way of French assistance, Franklin suggested he call Bancroft over from London to help him get started. The gospel according to Currey has it that Bancroft was already working for British Intelligence, that he came to Paris, promptly subverted Deane, recruited him, and went back to London to await his reports and pass them to the British.

That's simply not the way it happened. Deane wrote Bancroft from Bordeaux and Bancroft came immediately, meeting Deane in Paris in early July. He stayed two or three weeks, helped Deane get started, then returned to London promising to supply Deane with intelligence information via a clandestine contact in the French Embassy. Bancroft was a patriotic Loyalist who wanted to see the Colonies reunited with the Mother Country without a long and bloody war. Realizing that French intervention would probably lead to separation, he was troubled by Deane's secret mission. He talked it over with another good Loyalist, Paul Wentworth, of the New Hampshire Wentworths, whom he had known years before in Surinam. He didn't know that, since moving to England, Wentworth had gone to work as a case-officer for Sir William Eden who occupied a post in the BIS which would probably be called "Chief of

UNCLASSIFIED

Books

Operations" today. Wentworth promptly recruited Bancroft—doubled him, in fact, since he already had a clandestine relationship with Deane. When Bancroft returned to Paris in March, 1777, he was welcomed by his old friend Franklin and by his new friend Deane. They made him secretary of the mission, and he remained in this job throughout the war and the peace negotiations, reporting faithfully the whole time to his case-officer, to Eden, and to Lord Stormont, the British Ambassador.

Perhaps the most convincing evidence for this sequence of events is the famous letter of 1784 to Lord Carmarthen in which Bancroft states in practically so many words that he did just that. Since his purpose in writing Carmarthen was to detail his services to the Crown in order to get his pension payments resumed, Bancroft would most certainly have claimed credit for longer service as well as for the recruitment of Deane if he had indeed done so.

Another piece of evidence, not mentioned by Professor Currey, is the slightly ridiculous episode of "John the Painter." James Aitken (alias "John the Painter"), a Briton of doubtful character and tainted reputation, approached Deane in Paris and volunteered to sabotage the Portsmouth Navy Yard. Deane foolishly gave him his blessing, a little money, and Bancroft's true name and London address. John went to Portsmouth armed with a home-made incendiary device and managed to set fire to the rope walk in the Navy Yard. He then went to London, knocked on Bancroft's door, and told him what he had done. Bancroft, keenly aware of the possibility of provocation, reacted as a good double-agent should. He refused to do anything for John and got rid of him as quickly as possible. (John the Painter was the only person known to commit an act of sabotage in England on behalf of the Americans during the Revolution.)

Had Deane already been working for the British, it is doubtful he would have gone along with John's harebrained scheme in the first place. If he had—in order, perhaps, to preserve his *bone fides* as an American patriot—he would surely have sent word to Bancroft as to what was afoot in order to forestall any real damage. And Bancroft, had he not been a double-agent—i.e., if he *had* already recruited Deane and both of them were working for the British—would probably have turned John in to the authorities. As it was, John was picked up a month or so later in connection with a burglary in Hampshire and during his interrogation his part in the Navy Yard fire came out. The course of the affair points strongly to the conclusion that Deane had not yet been co-opted by the British. It also shows that Deane, in agreeing to participate in such a silly operation and in blowing his only agent in London, was a very naive and ungifted clandestine operator.

Richard Morris, a knowledgeable and meticulous scholar, states that Bancroft "undoubtedly subverted Deane." Possibly he did, but surely not until after he had gone to Paris PCS to join the American mission.

It was, parenthetically, this affair of John the Painter which apparently gave Eden and Wentworth the chance to get Bancroft credibly to Paris. During John's trial, Bancroft's name and connection with Deane came out, and he was arrested. His subsequent "escape" to Paris was probably engineered by the BIS, and thenceforward he was considered by all—Loyalist and Patriot alike—to be a throughgoing "rebel."

The third member of the mission, Arthur Lee, did not welcome his arrival. He denounced Bancroft to Franklin as a British spy, a fact gleefully and endlessly reiterated by anti-Franklin, pro-Lee writers ever since the truth came

out with the publication, in 1889, of the Stevens facsimiles. Currey soundly berates Franklin for his stubborn refusal to take Lee's accusation seriously. But while repeatedly stating that the basis of Lee's charge was information that Bancroft had, while in London, "been twice before the Privy Council," Currey neglects to point out that Arthur had this information from his brother William, who got it from a Dr. Ruston, who got it from an unnamed sea captain, who claimed to have been told this by a servant of Bancroft. Nor does Currey consider the unlikelihood of the BIS taking one of its best field agents in to be debriefed by the Privy Council—rather like taking a CIA agent to a meeting of the National Security Council.

Secure in the knowledge that, wherever else he had been, he had not been before the Privy Council, Bancroft brazenly confronted Lee and demanded he produce proof. Lee couldn't and, as far as Franklin was concerned, that was the end of the matter. The trouble with Lee was that he suspected nearly everybody, and after a while people got out of the habit of listening.

While Bancroft is Currey's arch-villain, he is by no means the only one. Currey cheerfully calls the roll of the British agents and collaborators who moved in and out of Passy or worked, from time to time, in the mission itself: the Reverend John Vardill, New York clergyman whose services to the BIS would, he hoped, be rewarded with the Regius Chair of Divinity at King's College (Columbia University); Jacobus van Zandt (alias George Lupton), scion of a prominent New York family and staunch Loyalist; Joseph Hynson, Eastern Shore Maryland sea captain, recruited by the Reverend Vardill outside a London brothel for the assignment of snitching the mission's pouch on its way from Paris to Philadelphia (a job he pulled off with admirable finesse); William Carmichael, also from Maryland, part-time secretary to Franklin and Deane and notorious blabbermouth; the two British officers Lt. Col. Smith and Maj. Thornton, the former a curious combination of case-officer, courier, and semi-overt channel to the British Government, the latter secretary to Arthur Lee (claimed by Currey to have been ployed into this position by Deane and Franklin) from which position he reported regularly to Eden; and finally Silas Deane himself whose eventual defection is clearly established but whose case deserves a great deal more in the way of careful scholarship than Currey's cavalier assertion that he was a British spy from the moment he set foot on European soil.

What, in all the world, asks Currey, was Ben doing, hobnobbing with such a pack of scoundrels?

What, indeed?

Well, in the first place it is possible that, lacking our 20-20 hindsight, Franklin didn't know they were a pack of scoundrels. He did know there were leaks—as did everyone else. He had, furthermore, a very relaxed attitude toward security. All kinds of people came and went in the mission's offices. Papers were left lying around where anyone could read them. Discussion of what ought to have been confidential matters took place within earshot of unauthorized visitors. To Currey this very sloppy procedure is totally inconsistent with Franklin's supposed cleverness, sagacity, and sophisticated awareness of the subtleties of diplomatic maneuvering. To him there can be but one conclusion: Ben wanted to make everything that went on in the mission available to the British. He wanted this because he wanted to torpedo the French alliance. He didn't want *any* European alliances. He "knew" (because Currey "knows") that independence

would be impossible to achieve without European alliances. *Ergo*, he didn't want independence. He "wept at the prospect of separation from England." And all this, of course, solely because, with independence, the Vandalia Project would go down the drain.

What is missing in Professor Currey's analysis is any acknowledgment of the fact that the American Revolution was also a bitterly contested civil war. Among the Loyalists were many very intelligent, well motivated, and dedicated people. And many a patriot underwent a long and difficult struggle with his conscience before finally opting for independence. While presenting himself as a demolisher of the Parson Weems school, Currey nevertheless clings tightly to the position that the "radicals" who insisted from the beginning on independence as the only possible solution to the quarrel were the only good guys, and that those who had reservations or were in any way ambivalent on the subject were all bad guys. Thus the Lees and Adamses are lily white, and the Franklins and Morrisses are jet black. Forgotten are such inconvenient matters as, for example, the fact that John Adams, four months after Bunker Hill, could still write William Lee that no one in the Colonies in his right mind wanted separation, or that during the siege of Boston the chaplain of Washington's army could still pray in public for the king.

That Franklin just might have been nervous about European alliances because he feared America would become a pawn in the interminable squabbles of Europe, or that he was "soft" on independence because of a feeling that his country might very well be better off connected to Britain by a sort of "Dominion Status" rather than shivering weak and alone in a cold, cruel world, are possibilities which Currey ignores.

As a matter of fact, Professor Currey ignores several things. As the villains of the piece are Franklin and Deane, so the hero is Arthur Lee—a dedicated and conscientious public servant who was set upon by his malevolent colleagues because they feared he would unmask their myriad malfeasances. Aside from a couple of throw-away lines to the effect that Lee's personality made him difficult to get along with, Currey doesn't bother with any of the contemporary evidence that Lee was not so much difficult as impossible to get along with, and that this might have had something to do with the implacable animosity toward Lee which Currey imputes to Ben.

Furthermore, Currey devotes pages to Ben's and, more especially, Deane's private war-profiteering while completely exonerating Lee from any such disreputable activity. Curiously he touches on an incident which, had he developed it a little, might have thrown a more balanced light on Lee's character. At the beginning of his first chapter, Currey gives us a dramatic account of the battle between *Bonhomme Richard* and *Serapis*, contrasting the heroism of John Paul Jones' sailors with the later-to-be-presented back-stabbing in Passy. He could have noted (but he did not) that not the least of Jones' problems in that engagement was the peculiar behavior of the frigate *Alliance*, the only new, commissioned warship in the infant American Navy. *Alliance* was, at the insistence of Lee and over Franklin's objections (Ben didn't *always* get his way), under the command of a starkly paranoid Frenchman, Pierre Landais. During the battle, *Alliance* hung around the fringes of the action, taking part only toward the end when she sailed in, delivered two broadsides into *Bonhomme Richard*, and drew off again leaving Jones in considerably worse shape than he was before.

On his return to France, having won his battle but lost his ship, a furious Jones tried desperately to get command of *Alliance*, but his efforts were thwarted by Lee. Somewhat later, when Lee was to return to America, he arranged to sail on *Alliance*. Before leaving, however, he ordered her cargo of military supplies unloaded and replaced by one of his own consisting of civilian goods on which he hoped to make a personal killing—thus indulging in the same kind of profiteering for which he (and Currey) continually denounced Deane and Franklin. Currey, in fact, comes down very hard on Franklin, Deane, Robert Morris, and various others in the matter of profiteering. In his outrage, he ignores the fact that there was almost no one among the Founding Fathers (with the possible exception of John Adams) who failed to reap some personal gain from the war—including even Washington who is said to have padded his expense accounts.

Incidentally, Lee's trip home on *Alliance* involved him in the U.S. Navy's first "Caine Mutiny." During the voyage his paranoid buddy, Landais, became so violently unstable that his officers finally took command of the vessel and brought her into Boston with her captain, Queeg-wise, under arrest. Naval discipline being what it was in the 18th Century, these officers were lucky to escape hanging. Only Landais' incredible behavior at the court-martial saved them, and, as it was, they were all cashiered from the service.

Of all this, of course, no word from Currey. His only mention of *Alliance* is to call her a "privateer frigate." Frigate she was; privateer she wasn't.

In concluding this review it might be well to return to Franklin's alleged cooperation with a "cell of British Intelligence," as Currey puts it, in Passy, as well as his sloppy security practices. There seems to be little room for doubt that Franklin was—well—unreasonably relaxed in the face of substantial security leaks. Had Professor Currey not been so eager to dash into the Lee-Franklin fray, or if, perhaps, he had decided to be referee rather than participant, he might have performed a valuable service to history by undertaking a careful and thorough analysis of Franklin's behavior and the possible reasons for it.

That Franklin was too stupid to know good security practices from bad is ridiculous. That he was too indolent and lethargic to bother to keep order in the mission, is perhaps a little more probable—he was, after all, in his seventies—but still unlikely. That he wanted, as Currey insists, the British to know everything the mission was up to is, however, an intriguing thought. Not that one needs to believe, with Currey, that Franklin sold out to the British in order to become a land baron in Ohio. (After all, if land-owning represented such a potent drive to his psyche as all that, he could easily have acquired large estates in Pennsylvania—heaven knows he had money enough.) Nor does Franklin's bureaucratic sloppiness tie in well with Currey's idea of Ben as an active and witting collaborator of the BIS. Such laxity is very poor tradecraft. Like Lee, Currey may be right for the wrong reasons.

As stated above, Franklin was not totally sold on the value of European alliances. He would have preferred to get along without them if possible. He was "soft," or at least ambivalent, on the subject of independence. "Dominion Status" or, perhaps, complete independence but with a treaty tying American commercial and political interests closely with those of England may have been what he had in mind. In any case, he was always open to peace feelers from London—a fact which Professor Currey seems to find somehow very shocking.

If Franklin's thoughts were indeed running along these lines, it would have been quite logical for him, as he himself put it, to "blow up the coals" of war between Britain and France, Spain, and Holland. England would then be forced to recall her fleet and armies from America and offer peace on terms which the Colonies could accept. Furthermore, if this could be done without signing the alliance with France, America would gain its independence, not only from Britain, but also, as Franklin devoutly wished, from possibly detrimental entanglements in European affairs.

Already the sheltering of American privateers in French and Dutch ports and the smuggling of arms from these ports to the Colonies were constantly exacerbating the friction between England and her continental neighbors. What if one were to go a step further and play more directly on England's fears of French intervention? How about ensuring that a constant stream of information on the progress of the Paris negotiations be channeled to Whitehall? Is it too far-fetched to imagine that Franklin tolerated leaks and agents and that he intentionally indulged in poor security practices as part of his calculated program of "blowing up the coals"?

And then there's one further possible angle. Currey is particularly distressed that, all through the war, Ben kept an extensive correspondence going with friends in England. Among these was David Hartley, member from Hull of the House of Commons and a strongly pro-American Whig. When, in the summer of 1779, a combined French-Spanish naval task force arrived in the Channel, and England was in a panic with fear of an invasion, it was David Hartley who rose in the Commons and moved that all operations in America be suspended for ten years, the fleet and army be brought home immediately, and peace overtures made. Unfortunately the motion lost when the Government pointed out that, in their treaty with France, the Americans had committed themselves not to make a separate peace. Nevertheless, it's tempting to speculate that Franklin's covert (and not so covert) political action operation of "blowing up the coals" might also have included contact with Hartley and other radical Whigs for exactly this purpose—the introduction of a peace motion in Parliament at a moment when it seemed most propitious. It shouldn't surprise anyone that Franklin would not have shared an operation like this with Arthur Lee and John Adams. They wouldn't have understood it. Lee's mind had closed tightly years before to the possibility of any solution to the quarrel with England other than complete independence and alliance with France. The deviousness of Franklin's approach would probably have offended Adams' plain, simple, straightforward, New England honesty.

If this was, indeed, Franklin's ploy, it turned out to be unachievable. It proved impossible to blow the coals into a blaze without first signing the treaty with France. But it was a good try. Whether we would all be better off now, or worse, if it had succeeded, is an interesting question—but moot.

Streeter Bass

SPIES IN THE SKY. By *John W. R. Taylor* and *David Mondey*. (Charles Scribner Sons, New York, 1973.)

Spies in the Sky is an attempt by the authors to call the world's attention to the role that reconnaissance has played in the victories of war as well as the preservation of peace. It is obvious that the authors are British reconnaissance buffs and are not at all ashamed to claim that reconnaissance ensured the allied victory in World War II and today provides a high threshold against World War III.

Although *Spies* traces the evolution of reconnaissance from the eighteenth century to present day satellites, it is the sort of book that can be read in either direction. From facts which are already enshrined in history, Taylor and Mondey recapitulate reconnaissance missions with a bit of spice and anecdotes à la *Reader's Digest*. When it comes to classified programs, however, or where their material is limited, their research is superficial. Their version of the history of the U-2 is an example: They attribute the development of the U-2 to the U.S. Air Force, but later acknowledge that the program came under the control of CIA; they attribute the first camera in the U-2 to Dr. Edwin Land, a camera remarkable enough to distinguish golf balls on a putting green from fifty-five thousand feet. Not so. Land of course, as we know, was instrumental in encouraging the President to approve the U-2 program, and he gave liberally of his time in "pushing" the development of the U-2 as well as other CIA reconnaissance systems which were to come. However, he did *not* develop the camera carried by the U-2; moreover, his company has yet to hold a U.S. Government contract.

For the sake of clarity and contrary to the book's statements, U-2 pilots were not taken from any civilian sources. Taylor or Mondey, or possibly both, get slightly mixed up in their chronology and are somewhat self-contradictory when they note that the U-2 entered service in 1956, yet two pages later assert that the U-2s maintained a bird's eye view of the Soviet Aviation Day fly-by over Moscow in July 1955. The Moscow overflight did occur in July 1956. Probably the most flagrant error, however, is the literal interpretation of the U-2 as a "powered glider." The authors state: "The all-important question of range was resolved by building in effect a powered glider. By shutting down the turbojet engine, and gliding for long periods of flight, the U-2, as it became known, was able to transverse remarkable distances at heights beyond the reach of contemporary fighters or defensive missiles." The U-2 indeed can glide but should the engine flame out at altitude, a restart cannot be effected until the aircraft has dropped to thicker atmosphere at approximately 35,000 feet, well within the range of everyday fighters and guns. Normally everyone, most especially the pilots, prayed that the engine would remain "lit" throughout the course of the mission. The authors also mix up the initial deployment of the U-2 overseas. The first deployment was to Lakenheath, England, in April 1956, shortly redeployed to Wiesbaden, then Giebelstadt, Germany, by June 1956. The assignment of a second detachment to Incirlik Air Force Base at Adana, Turkey, took place in August 1956.

In the main, the book adds little new to the U-2 story.

A thread of righteousness of reconnaissance remains heavy throughout the book. Taylor and Mondey praise President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" policy and set out to prove the wisdom of this philosophy as each new reconnaissance

system is added to the Free World's stable. The authors sum up the Open Skies proposal as "a mutual photographic reconnaissance policy." The authors continue to beat the drums for reconnaissance after the downing of the U-2 on 1 May 1960 by stating that "President Eisenhower summed it up neatly when he said: 'Aerial photography has been one of the many methods we have used to keep ourselves and the Free World abreast of major Soviet military developments. The usefulness of this work has been well established through four years of effort. The Soviets were well aware of it. The plain truth is this: when a nation needs intelligence activity, there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed.'"

The book then leads us through the tense moments of the Cuban missile crisis and claims that "the Cuban missile crisis emphasized the peace-keeping power of aerial surveillance. It gave the world an impressive demonstration of the potential of the Open Skies policy that had been proposed by President Eisenhower. No longer was it possible to argue that reconnaissance aircraft could find useful employment only in times of war. The aviation pioneers would have cheered to a man could they have known that the vehicle they gave to the world as a new and exciting means of communication has been able to preserve mankind from a horrifying end."

In flashback we observe that the first recorded use of an airplane in war took place on 23 October 1911. It was a reconnaissance sortie. Taylor and Mondey portray the development of aircraft as a retaliation against "the other side's reconnaissance capabilities."

It is a truism as the authors state that "Reconnaissance, in its many forms, has become interwoven so inextricably with the military duties of electronic intelligence gathering, airborne early warning, electronic countermeasures, electronic counter-countermeasures, airborne warning and control system operations, anti-submarine warfare and other tasks that the aeroplane itself is the least complex and least costly component of the overall weapon system." They do not even blush when they state "Never again will combat aeroplanes be the simple, uncluttered shapes they used to be. Reconnaissance—the vital key to victory on land and sea that gave birth to military aviation—has proliferated to such a degree that it must now dominate military thinking, planning and spending. 'Know your enemy' is the oldest of old axioms for the war leader. Equally, the enemy must be prevented from knowing you."

The trail through the world of reconnaissance with our authors finally leads us to the satellite programs, and here it is apparent that prime sources are found wanting. Taylor and Mondey fill in their knowledge gaps with more poetic license than a book of this sort should, but again normal research was undoubtedly prejudiced by classification.

The authors employ the old trick of "telling them what you told them" by summing up what they tried to do in writing the book in the first place. This occurs when they profess:

In the pages of this book we have already learnt something of the meaning of an effective deterrent. More importantly, we should have gained some appreciation of the part that aerial and satellite reconnaissance can play in providing the in-depth intelligence needed to maintain the kind of delicate parity established by the SALT agreement, in terms of both strategic offensive missiles and anti-ballistic missile systems.

There is no reason to suppose that leaders in the United States are not fully aware of this grave responsibility; or that they are ignorant of the part which reconnaissance has to play in maintaining a peace that, however costly or uneasy, is infinitely preferable to a war that can only bring worldwide devastation.

On the contrary, there is every indication that the Americans appreciate fully the vital and continuing role of reconnaissance, and this is confirmed by recent reports of new "spy" satellites which are already operational or in the planning stage.

In summary, the authors have attempted to set forth a strong case for the vital role which reconnaissance has played in achieving military victory and the role it continues to play in insuring peace. While the authors certainly have picked an exciting topic to talk about, and one we certainly subscribe to, their treatise falls somewhat short. They have given a snapshot (no pun intended) account of reconnaissance and, while meaning well, hardly begin to build the case it richly deserves.

John N. McMahon

COMPANY MAN. By Joe Maggio. (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1972. 222 pages.)

Emblazoned on the dust jacket of *Company Man* is the eye-catching phrase: "A Novel About the CIA's Mercenaries." The flaps of the dust jacket add more to whet one's appetite for an evening's reading. This is a book, they proclaim, "so shocking that it promises to generate excitement, alarm, and controversy." Actually, it laid an egg.

More blurb:

Startling in its authenticity, *Company Man* is the painfully vivid story of a CIA mercenary—an insider's account. . . . In this brutal novel, Joe Maggio exposes the shadow world of the CIA ("the Company") and the mercenaries paid to die for their country. The story centers on Nick Martin, contract employee of the CIA's Special Operating Division (SOD). . . . An arm of the Company that runs virtually unreined, the SOD employs outcasts, criminals, and ex-military men in the "world defense against Communism."

The dust jacket describes Maggio as "a graduate of the Farm—the SOD's 'secret' training base in Langley, Virginia." "Never before," we are told, "have CIA training and operations—both domestic and international—been presented so convincingly in fact or in fiction." The back of the book jacket informs the gullible readers that Joe Maggio "has previously worked as a mercenary soldier, largely for the Central Intelligence Agency." His alleged bases of operation were Southeast Asia, the Congo, and Cuba.

The novel is a hoax.

Perhaps the unwary reader may breathe a sigh of relief at the opening words of the introduction: "Though it is a novel, *Company Man* is a novel of facts. Casting the book as straight nonfiction was out of the question—chiefly

because of national security." The author tries to assure us once more that: "Much here will be difficult for the reader to accept; but with regard to the CIA, nothing is impossible." The publisher's blurb, sent to unsuspecting book-sellers, is equally lurid.

On 19 July 1972, after receipt of an advance copy of *Company Man*, Mr. William E. Colby, then Executive Director of CIA, wrote the president of Putnam's, the publisher, noting the claims as to the authenticity of the book. In his letter, Mr. Colby wrote that:

Taken together, the above statements indicate that you believe you are publishing an accurate, though thinly veiled, account of actual experiences. If you truly believe this, I am afraid you are the victim of a hoax.

Mr. Colby then went on to advise the publisher as to his reasons for this statement, adding that *Company Man*

is largely a fabrication interlarded with a few instances taken from [Maggio's] training period which might have some validity.

Mr. Colby also took the opportunity, in his letter, to deny two of the charges in Maggio's book: that CIA carries out assassinations and has participated in or condones traffic in drugs.

On the 27th of July, the president of Putnam's replied to Mr. Colby that "You are indeed correct about our beliefs as to his book *Company Man*. The content of your letter would indeed seem to indicate a hoax." However, the fact that they had so luridly described a book which they now knew to be a hoax did not lead Putnam's to withdraw the book from sale or to indicate publicly that they had been hoaxed. Despite its exaggerated claims, *Company Man* did not sell very well.

Maggio's mischief did not begin or end with *Company Man*. Instead, he has tried to push his theme in radio interviews (in one of which he claimed to have been a CIA case officer in Laos), and succeeded in coking up the local Virginia press with exposures of the covert CIA training base at "Camp Perry" (*sic*), Virginia. To Maggio, security was meaningless, as we had learned in his brief contract association with the Agency.

Joseph Alan Maggio was born in 1938. In January 1966, he was approved for CIA contract employment in a covert project. In June 1966, while in training at a special Agency site in the United States, information began to be available which raised questions as to Maggio's suitability for Agency employment. In early August 1966, Maggio was terminated for cause, part of which was his loquacity and continued indiscretion, particularly boasting to anyone who would listen of his nonexistent experiences with CIA. The least of his boasts was that he had been a Special Forces captain, although his highest rank had been that of sergeant. There were several derelictions of a more serious nature.

The fact of the matter is that Maggio never undertook any assignments for CIA at Headquarters, and he never served overseas while with CIA. He was only a trainee. Therefore, his descriptions of his own activities in the guise of his fictional hero, Nick Martin, are largely fake depictions as Maggio tried to equate his hero with his own views of himself. He has described himself as a Vietnam war hero who had participated in behind-the-lines CIA activities

while there, and has written more of this tripe regarding his role in Vietnam for a Miami newspaper, where he also wrote of his role as a soldier of fortune in the Congo, also a fabrication. To the best of our knowledge, Maggio never served in combat while on active military duty, and he certainly never "worked as a mercenary soldier, largely for the Central Intelligence Agency," as claimed on the dust jacket of his book.

The most that can be said for *Company Man* is that, in the course of almost six months of CIA training, Maggio was able to pick up enough fact and gossip to put some plausible details into his fiction. To point out the countless errors of fact in his text, or to rebut the incredible statements he makes about CIA activities and its personnel, would be to dignify the book by reviewing a text which is not worth the reading. We have included this much only to indicate to those interested in the literature of intelligence, particularly readers of *Studies in Intelligence* in generations to come, that *Company Man* should not be a book that they would want to read, either as fact or fiction.

Walter Pforzheimer

THE POLITICS OF LYING: GOVERNMENT DECEPTION, SECRECY, AND POWER. By David Wise. (Random House, New York, 1973) 415 pp.

One sometimes wishes that the Founding Fathers could be subpoenaed—even under a grant of immunity if need be—to testify as to just exactly what they *did* have in mind when they wrote the U.S. Constitution.

When they wrote in the First Amendment, for example, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion," meaning that no one church could be favored over another as the Anglicans are as the Established Church in England, did they have the remotest intention that prayers should be outlawed in the public schools?

The Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights states that "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizure shall not be violated." It is perhaps understandable that a Constitution written almost 200 years ago has nothing to say about wiretaps, but the fact remains that the phrase "invasion of privacy" appears nowhere in the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or the later Amendments. The legal concept of a right of privacy first saw the light of day in Justice Tom C. Clark's decision in *Mapp v. Ohio* (381 US 485) in 1961, when Clark referred to the Fourth Amendment as "creating a right to privacy." It was further expanded in 1965 by Justice William O. Douglas (in *Griswold v. Connecticut* (379 US 85 S.C.) who found that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance." Within the shade of these copious "penumbras," the courts have now found that the Fourth Amendment says a man cannot be successfully prosecuted if the government will not reveal the circumstances of any third-party wiretap in which the defendant was overheard or even mentioned!

And so we are being drawn these days into the penumbra of the First Amendment, whose less ethereal substance provides merely that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press." There is nothing in

the Constitution extending similar guarantees of a right to *collect* information by any means, as distinct from the right to *publish* it, once obtained. Recently, in fact, courts have upheld contempt sentences against reporters who argued that their right to publish carried with it an immunity for their means of collecting it. But the New Breed of committed reporters, the "engagés" who frown on objective news, are in full cry to establish that the First Amendment actually guarantees what they call "The Right to Know." The government of a democracy, they argue, has no right to withhold or protect any information the press wants. If it is classified, it should be declassified on request. And even if it remains classified, freedom of the press is infringed upon by any law providing punishment for the keeper of such information who leaks it! *

David Wise has written the most thorough exposition yet of this argument in *The Politics of Lying*, with his thesis that:

... through official secrecy, we now have a system of institutionalized lying. Policy makers who consider it desirable to mask their decisions or their objectives, or who wish to mislead the public, or withhold information, can do so as easily as reaching for the nearest rubber stamp. In short, *lying and secrecy are two sides of the same coin*. [emphasis added.]

This is about the most careful statement of Wise's thesis. Elsewhere he leaves little doubt of his view that secrecy is lying. The first 11 pages of the book are devoted to the Son Tay raid and Defense Secretary Laird's testimony to Sen. Fulbright's Foreign Relations Committee. Subsequent disclosure of further details indicated that Laird was guilty of what Kipling's schoolmasters called *suppressio veri*, if not *suggestio falsi*. Laird in reply told a press conference: "I was never asked the question . . . If you'll read over the record, you'll find that the question was not asked . . . that is not my responsibility . . . I answer questions, but I only answer the questions that are asked." A valid answer for a man charged with maintaining security in a combat situation, and Wise does not dispute any of it. He merely comments that Laird "had lied repeatedly in public statements and in testimony to the Congress."

Among other Wise judgments are these:

The classification and secrecy system . . . has resulted, I have suggested, in a system of institutionalized lying. . . . My own view is that the present classification system should be junked. I doubt if there is any need for a formal system of official secrecy in the United States. . . . It is a relic of the Cold War. It breeds concealment and mistrust; it encourages the government to lie. (pp. 347-349)

If Congress attempts to legislate secrecy . . . it could open the door to a law prohibiting the press from publishing what Congress has defined as secret. . . . Once this line is crossed, or even if existing espionage statutes are applied to the press, the First Amendment—and the American system—would be dangerously diminished. (p. 351)

*Cf. Wise, p. 151: "Punishment of officials also has, or may have, a chilling effect. Other officials may then be less inclined to talk to reporters. If so, the flow of information to the press about what the government is doing is bound to be reduced, raising at least indirectly a First Amendment consideration."

There is a considerable amount of inconsistency in Wise's arguments. On page 229, for example, he faults President Nixon for the pre-Inauguration statement to his prospective cabinet officers: "Always remember, the men and women of the news media approach this as an adversary relationship." This statement, Wise said, introduced "the strongest, most highly coordinated, and ultimately the most dangerous attack on the nation's constitutionally protected free press since the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798." Compare this with Wise himself on pp. 160-161:"

.... there is in this country an inbuilt tension between press and government that can not and *should not* be reconciled. And the differences between them are intrinsic and fundamental. Government has the right to classify and attempt to protect its secrets. The press has a right to try to obtain and publish those secrets. These are two forces that will continually be in some danger of conflict.

Again, commenting on Arthur Sylvester's celebrated statement, that "it's inherent in government's right, if necessary, to lie to save itself when it's going up into a nuclear war," Wise rules that "Government does have an alternative to lying. It can tell the truth, or it can say nothing." (p. 39) But saying nothing amounts to silence, and Wise says silence is secrecy, and secrecy is lying.

By and large, the book is a collection of anecdotes and detailed histories of confrontations between the government and the media. There are lengthy sections on leaks and other information techniques. A check of chapter headings shows only two that bear more directly on the Intelligence field: "Secrecy, National Security, and the Press," and "The Case of the Colorado Tibetans."

In these, CIA fares no better and no worse than is to be expected. Wise gleefully and gratuitously blows a few code words and other intelligence secrets, some accurately, some inaccurately. The "Colorado Tibetans," a training operation in the Rockies, "is disclosed here for the first time," a statement which must come as a bit of a shock to authors of pieces in the *San Francisco Chronicle* in September 1970, the *Washington Post* in January 1971, and the *Denver Post Empire Magazine* in February 1972.

There are several snide remarks and misleading allegations about the Agency which can flatly be called lies only by Wise's own standards. Possibly because so much less space is devoted to the subject of intelligence, there are fewer outright inaccuracies than in previous books he has co-authored on the subject. The intelligence business, however, is struck several glancing blows:

Government lying has also resulted from the growth of a huge intelligence establishment since 1947. This invisible government, with the CIA at its center, has frequently engaged in security operations that have led the United States to tell official lies. . . . The intelligence practitioners are apparently unconcerned with the long-range effect on American democracy of government lying; . . . they speak of confining intelligence operations to those that are "plausibly deniable." Thus, the standard is not truth, but fashioning lies that will be believed. (p. 31)

Wise makes no attempt to discuss whether cover stories are essential to intelligence work—to him, they are just another form of lying.

Similarly, with reference to President Kennedy's timely "cold" which was the pretext for cutting short a political trip and returning to Washington during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, "the justification for misleading the American press and public was the necessity to mislead the enemy. It is a justification that permits almost limitless deception in the name of 'national security'." (p. 38.)

And finally, on page 40, "In May of 1961, also without public announcement, Kennedy ordered the CIA to undertake a program of covert action against Hanoi, including the infiltration into North Vietnam for sabotage and intelligence gathering." Wise, unfortunately, does not specify just what kind of "public announcement" Kennedy should have made; possibly the infiltration teams should have applied to Hanoi for visas?

Clinton B. Conger

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/12/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010004-7

Approved For Release 2004/12/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010004-7